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EXTENDING DEFERENCE TO PRISON OFFICIALS
UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
WHITLEY v. ALBERS
The Constitution's eighth amendment "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" clause guarantees prisoners the right to be free from excessive
punishment.' Eighth amendment claims historically were based on
physical punishment and the infliction of pain.2 Courts recently have
expanded the clause's application to provide protection against more
subtle forms of punishment.3 Prisoners are now using the eighth
amendment to obtain healthier and safer living conditions during the
course of their confinement. 4 At the same time, however, prison offi-
1. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
2. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (physical pain and suffering
beyond what civilized people can tolerate); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
(hard labor in chains and constant surveillance); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446
(1890) (burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel); cf Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (second preparation of execution after previ-
ous unsuccessful attempt due to mechanical failure was not cruel and unusual
punishment).
3. Federal courts have achieved "sweeping reforms" in reviewing constitutional
challenges to the prison system. Federal courts no longer apply the eighth amendment
only to specific acts of punishment inflicted upon specific individuals. Courts instead
apply the eighth amendment equally to the general conditions of prison confinement.
Comment, Challenging Cruel and Unusual Conditions of Prison Confinement: Refining
the Totality of Approach, 26 How. L.J. 227 (1983) (needlessly inflicted pain and suffer-
ing did not fulfill valid penological purposes). See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337
(1981). In Rhodes the Court adopted a totality of conditions approach to determine if
double-celling constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 348. The Rhodes
Court reasoned that double-celling would violate the eighth amendment if the situation
inflicted "unnecessary or wanton pain" or was "grossly disproportionate to the severity
of crimes warranting imprisonment." Id. The Court also noted, however, that the
Constitution does not require comfortable prisons. Id. at 349. As a result, courts retain
broad discretion in making such findings. See infra notes 21-23 (discusses the evolving
standards of decency).
4. See, eg., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (length of confinement in isolation
cell considered together with inmates' diet, continued overcrowding, rampant violence,
and security personnel's poor jurdgment); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.
1980) (combination of factors including lack of sufficient space, inadequate temperature
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cials can discipline prisoners and inflict pain upon them if such force is
necessary to effectively operate the prison.' In Whitley v. Albers6 the
Supreme Court held that a prisoner who was shot while prison officials
were quelling a prison riot did not suffer cruel and unusual
punishment.7
In Whitley a prison riot began when an armed inmate assaulted a
security officer8 and took a second security officer hostage.9 The prison
security manager devised a plan to free the hostage by approaching the
inmate and hostage unarmed, while security officers, armed with shot-
control and ventilation, sewage problems, and unsanitary kitchen facilities led to con-
clusion that prison was unfit for human habitation). See infra notes 40-41 and accom-
panying text for discussion of prisoners' rights to safe prison conditions.
5. See infra notes 9, 36 and accompanying texts for discussion of the amount of
force prison officials may use to maintain order and control.
6. 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986). Albers was an inmate at Oregon State Penitentiary living
with 200 other prisoners in cellblock "A." Id. at 1081. Whitley was the prison security
manager. See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text for discussion of the facts.
7. Id. at 1087-88. The Court found that the prison official shot the prisoner in a
good faith effort to restore the internal order and security of the prison. Id. at 1087.
The Court stressed the necessity of deferring to the judgment of prison officials respond-
ing to "an actual confrontation with riotous inmates" and taking "preventive measures"
to reduce the likelihood of similar disturbances. Id. at 1085. See infra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text for additional discussion of deference accorded prison officials in
operating prisons.
8. Id. at 1082. The inmates in cellblock "A" lived on the lower and upper (second
floor) tiers. Id. at 1081. A stairway connecting the two tiers was the only feasible way
to move from one tier to another. Id. The assault occurred when an inmate, after
disobeying orders to return to his prison cell, jumped from the upper tier of cells onto a
prison official below. Id. at 1082.
9. Id. at 1082. The inmate proceeded up the stairs to the second tier of jail cells
with the hostage and threatened to kill the hostage if the remaining officers formed an
assault squad. Id. Shortly thereafter, the kidnapper told Whitley that another inmate
had already been killed and that others would die. Id. Although no inmate had been
killed, one had been beaten. Id. Albers, who lived on the upper tier, testified that he
then went down the stairs to check on the elderly inmates on the lower tier in the event
that the guards used tear gas to quell the riot. Id. Whitley contemplated using tear gas
but decided against it. Id.
Prisons officials may use mace, tear gas, or other chemical agents without violating
the cruel and unusual punishment clause if reasonably necessary to prevent riots or to
subdue recalcitrant prisoners. Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984)(mace properly used against prisoners who refused to obey direct orders during security
measures). Use of such chemicals to control an inmate may be a safer and more effec-
tive alternative than a physical confrontation. Norris v. District of Columbia, 614 F.
Supp. 294 (D.D.C. 1985) (use of mace is an appropriate alternative to physical force
when other means of controlling the prisoner are futile).
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guns, covered him.1" The security manager gave a prison officer orders
to fire a warning shot and to shoot low at any prisoner who attempted
to interfere with the rescue. 1 Albers, a prisoner, followed the security
manager shortly after he began his rescue attempt. 12 After two warn-
ing shots, the covering officer fired a shot at Albers that struck his
knee. 3 Albers brought suit against the prison officer under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,14 alleging a deprivation of rights under the eighth amend-
ment. i" The District Court for the District of Oregon directed a ver-
dict for the prison officer. 16 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed in part.' 7 The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 deci-
10. 106 S. Ct. at 1082.
11. Id. Whitley made this order out of concern for both his and the hostage's safety.
Id. Prison administrators are entitled to take all steps necessary to ensure the prison
staff's safety. Soto, 744 F.2d at 1268. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text
(discusses the boundaries of permissible prison conditions and restrictions established in
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
12. 106 S. Ct. at 1083.
13. Id. The security officer's first shot was a warning shot in the opposite direction
of the cellblock, while his next shot was fired towards the stairway. The officer's third
and final shot hit Albers while he was on the stairs. Id.
14. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
15. Albers v. Whitley, 546 F. Supp. 726 (D. Or. 1982). Albers originally claimed
that his constitutional rights had been violated under the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Id. at 732. The district court acknowledged that the eighth amendment applies
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983) (life imprisonment for prisoner charged with issuing a "no-account" check was
cruel and unusual punishment under eighth and fourteenth amendments); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (state law under which a narcotics addict with a clean
record in that state was imprisoned inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the fourteenth amendment). Albers, however, had to rely solely on the eighth
amendment because he failed to assert an independent violation of due process under
the fourteenth amendment. 546 F. Supp. at 732 n. 1.
16. 546 F. Supp. at 729. The court found that the prison official's use of force in his
attempt to quell the riot, aid in the rescue plan, and restore prison security was appro-
priate and necessary, and that a reasonable jury could not have concluded differently.
Id. at 734.
17. 743 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986). The court con-
cluded from the record that a jury could have found that the prison disturbance had
subsided prior to the use of deadly force, thereby rendering such force excessive. 743
F.2d at 1376.
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sion t8 and held that the infliction of pain during a prison riot, whether
due to inadvertence or good faith error, does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.19
The phrase "cruel and unusual" punishment2" originally was used in
the United States21 to forbid torturous and barbaric methods of in-
flicting pain upon criminals.22 Beginning in the twentieth century
courts no longer isolated the punishment from the crime to determine
in the abstract whether the punishment was fair or cruel.23 Courts in-
stead began to consider a punishment fair if it was proportionate to the
crime committed.24
In order to allege cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment, a prisoner must first state a cause of action under 42
18. Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined.
19. 106 S. Ct. at 1087-88.
20, See supra note 1.
21. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The basic concept underlying the eighth
amendment is preservation of the dignity of man and the need for the states to adhere to
civilized standards of punishment. Id. at 100-01. The phrase "cruel and unusual" was
taken verbatim from the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, id. at 100, and was
eventually included in the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution in 1791.
Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted. The Original Meaning, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969).
The "cruel and unusual" clause in the English Bill of Rights was intended, however,
to incorporate an earlier common law prohibition against excessive punishments. Id. at
847. Critics found it paradoxical that the American colonists "omitted a prohibition on
excessive punishments and adopted instead the prohibition of cruel methods of punish-
ment, which had never existed in English law." Id.
22. Eighth amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the courts have adjudi-
cated someone guilty of a crime, thereby acquiring the power to punish the criminal.
See City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (police
officer denying liability for hospital bill after injuring robbery suspect did not inflict
cruel and unusual punishment); Ingraham v. Wright, 439 U.S. 651, 672-73 n.40 (1977)
(the eighth amendment does not apply to disciplinary punishment in public schools).
See supra note 2 for various methods of cruel and unusual punishment.
23. See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (punishment is cruel and unusual when it is
incompatible with the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society").
24. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (defendant convicted of falsifying
official document was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor with ankle chains). The
Court's decision in Weems for the first time invalidated a statute because the punish-
ment it imposed following imprisonment was cruel and excessive. Id. at 382. A crimi-
nal sentence must be proportionate to the crime committed. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
291 (1983).
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U.S.C. § 1983.25 Under this provision, the prisoner must prove that a
person acting under the color of state law26 caused the conduct com-
plained of and that this conduct deprived the prisoner of his constitu-
tional rights.27 Although prisoners have a clearly established eighth
amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the
section 1983 burden of proof is difficult to satisfy because governmental
officials usually invoke a good faith defense against claims arising from
the performance of discretionary functions.28
One of the first cases to develop a test to determine whether punish-
ment was cruel and unusual was Gregg v. Georgia.29 In Gregg the
Supreme Court held that the death penalty for a convicted murderer
did not invariably violate the eighth amendment. 3' The Court first ex-
amined Georgia's statutory scheme, 3t which required the Georgia
25. Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir. 1986) (victim has burden of prov-
ing that injuries inflicted "exceeded the boundaries . . redressable under tort law").
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text for additional discussion of claims under
§ 1983.
26. "Under the color of" state law refers to the actions of state officers performing
their duties pursuant to state authority. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1960). See,
e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (state prison officials act under the color of
state law).
27. Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1985) (prisoner failed to state a cause
of action under § 1983 because he was unable to prove denial of eighth or fourteenth
amendment rights); cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (although prison
officials satisfied "under color of state law" requirement, availability of state post-depri-
vation remedies available from the state precluded a constitutional claim under the
fourteenth amendment).
28. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The Harlow Court stated that
"[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages in so far as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights." Id. at 818. Cf Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020 (8th
Cir. 1984). In Miller the Court stated that "[p]rison officials are not entitled to a good
faith defense if they are aware of the risk of injury to an inmate and nevertheless fail to
take appropriate steps to protect the inmate from that known danger." Id. at 1024. See
Joseph v. Brierton, 739 F.2d 1244, 1250 (7th Cir. 1984) (prison officials showing "will-
ful neglect" of prisoners' medical needs are not entitled to good faith defense under
§ 1983).
29. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
30. Id. at 207. The Court recognized that under Georgia's statute the state retained
the death penalty for six categories of crime. Id. at 162-63. These categories are: mur-
der, kidnapping for ransom or when the victim is harmed, armed robbery, rape, treason,
and aircraft hijacking. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, 26-1311, 26-1902, 26-2001, 26-
2201, 26-3301 (1972).
31. Id. at 186-87. In its review of the Georgia statute, the Gregg Court first noted
that each state legislature has the authority to conduct a "moral census" of its citizens
1987]
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Supreme Court to review jury decisions recommending the death pen-
alty. The Court concluded that Georgia's scheme was constitutional if
the jury decision was proportionate to the punishment usually imposed
in similar cases.32 The Court then applied a two part test for determin-
ing whether a punishment was cruel and unusual.33 First, a punish-
ment must not be an "unnecessary and wanton" infliction of pain.34
Second, a punishment must not be "grossly out of proportion" to the
severity of the offense.35 The Court's development of this two part test
represented a significant step towards more precisely identifying those
forms of excessive punishment the Court would regard as cruel and
unusual.3 6
regarding the death penalty. Id. The Court approved of Georgia's statute because its
provision for appellant review "serves as a check against the random or arbitrary impo-
sition of the death penalty." Id. at 206.
32. Id. at 206-07. The Court agreed with the theory of focusing the jury's attention
on the nature of the crime and the characteristics of the individual defendant. Id. at
206. Cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death penalty for the crime of
rape is grossly disproportionate and, therefore, forbidden under the eighth amendment)
(plurality opinion).
33. 428 U.S. at 173. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text for discussion of
early interpretations of "cruel and unusual" punishment.
34. 428 U.S. at 173. Punishment is unnecessary if an alternative exists that is both
significantly less severe punishment and adequate to achieve the same purpose. Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. 428 U.S. at 173. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem the
Supreme Court developed a three step analysis for reviewing the proportionality of the
sentence. The three criteria are: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) the comparison of sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the
comparison of sentences imposed on criminals in other jurisdictions. 463 U.S. at 290-
92. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (thirty day limitation imposed on
sentences of punitive isolation inside prison prevents disproportionate penalties); United
States v. Wilson, 787 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1986) (fifty year sentence for criminal who held
a family hostage at gunpoint and robbed a bank was not grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the offense).
36. 428 U.S. at 173. The Court in Gregg recognized the necessity for an objective
test because "public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal sanc-
tions are not conclusive." Id. In other words, an individual retains the right to be free
of excessive punishment, even if the result is contrary to public opinion. Id. The Court
emphasized that the eighth amendment precludes punishment that fails to sustain "the
dignity of man." Id. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). See Slakan v. Porter,
737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (high-pressure water hoses, tear gas, and billy clubs
used indiscriminately against a defenseless prisoner locked in a cell constituted cruel
and unusual punishment). See generally Comment, The Effect of Rhodes v. Chapman
on the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 35 ARK. L. REV. 731 (1982)(discusses the "dignity of man" concept).
Courts determine whether pain is inflicted in an unnecessary and wanton manner
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The Supreme Court further defined the protective scope of the Gregg
test in Estelle v. Gamble3 7 when it acknowledged that deprivation of
essential health needs inside a jail may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.38 In Estelle a prison doctor treated a prisoner's back in-
jury with various medications, but chose not to use X-rays. The Court
held that the physician's treatment did not violate the eighth amend-
ment.39 The Court reasoned that only "deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's serious illness or injury" constituted a basis for a cause of
action under section 1983.' The Court emphasized that mere negli-
from the circumstances of each case. Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment to the Use
of Force Against Prison Inmates, 60 B.U.L. REv. 332, 339 (1980) (discusses judicial
approaches to applying the eighth amendment to cases involving the use of force against
prisoners). The same degree of force reasonably necessary to quell a prison disturbance
that may lead to a riot is clearly unreasonable for purposes of placing a recalcitrant
prisoner in an isolation cell. Id. See Newby v. Serviss, 590 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mich.
1984). In Newby the court held that deadly force used to stop a convict's escape from
prison was not excessive. Id. at 596. The court noted that although firing warning
shots and shooting only to disable are preferable, deadly force is appropriate when other
alternatives would be ineffective. Id.
37. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
38. Id. at 102-03. During incarceration, a prisoner must rely solely upon prison
officials to treat his medical needs. Id. at 103. Denial of medical care, which could lead
to pain and suffering or even death, is "inconsistent with contemporary standards of
decency," and serves no penological purpose. Id. See, e.g., Joseph v. Brierton, 739 F.2d
1244 (7th Cir. 1983) (prison officials who willfully neglected prisoner's serious mental
illness by allowing him to remain in "bestial" conditions were not entitled to § 1983
immunity).
39. 429 U.S. at 107-08. Noting that the doctors treated the prisoner's back injury
with "bed rest," muscle relaxants and pain relievers," the Court held that a medical
decision not to obtain an X-ray "does not represent cruel and unusual punishment. At
most it is medical malpractice." Id.
40. Id. at 105. Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs occurs
when "prison officials have prevented an inmate from receiving recommended treatment
or when an inmate is denied access to medical personnel capable of evaluating the need
for treatment." Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981). In general, deliberate indifference may manifest itself through either
actual intent or recklessness. Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 n.8 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). See Lewis El v. O'Leary, 631 F. Supp. 60, 62-63
(N.D. I11. 1986) (prison officials' awareness of only a "mere possibility" of a risk that
fellow inmates would attack the prisoner did not constitute deliberate indifference).
The scope of the Court's holding in Estelle was not limited to the protection of pris-
oners' health. Prison officials also have the duty to protect prisoners from unwarranted
physical injury such as violent attacks and sexual assaults by other inmates. See, e.g.,
Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (prisoner suffered head injury in
prison gym when barbell slipped off of bar); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.
1977) (prisoner suffered violent attacks and sexual assaults by inmates in protective
segregation area); Hanna v. Lane, 610 F. Supp. 32 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (prisoner became
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gence or "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" alone
was not an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.4
Although Estelle prohibited prison officials from showing deliberate
indifference for prisoners' health, in Bell v. Wolfish42 the Court stated
that prison inmates were not necessarily entitled to unlimited constitu-
tional rights.43 The Bell Court declared that prison officials could im-
pose any condition or restriction that was reasonably related to a
"legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective." 44 The Court noted
that incarceration alone was a justified limitation on an inmate's consti-
tutional rights.45 The Court stressed that the necessity of maintaining
blind after prison doctor failed to administer diagnostic tests); cf Johnston v. Lucas,
786 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1986) (prison guards, who mistakenly put inmate in same jail
cell with second inmate who had made a death threat to the first inmate, were not guilty
of conscious indifference after stabbing incident occurred); Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d
168 (7th Cir. 1985) (prison official must first have knowledge of risks to victim to be
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See supra note 25 and accompanying text for discussion
of government officials' liability under § 1983.
41. 429 U.S. at 105. In Estelle the Court found that the prison doctor's negligence
in treating the prisoner's back injury did not state a valid claim under the eighth amend-
ment. Id. at 107. See Estate of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1984) (prison
officials, without knowledge of "strong likelihood" of risk of attack to prisoner, lacked
callous indifference when placing decedent in same cell with murderer); see also Duck-
worth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985) (gross negligence by prison officials is
insufficient to violate the eighth amendment); but cf Massop v. Coughlin, 770 F.2d 299(2d Cir. 1985) (in appropriate circumstances, even a merely negligent act may give rise
to a cause of action under § 1983).
42. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The prisoners brought a class action suit challenging the
prison conditions at the newly-built Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New
York City. Id. at 524. The majority of the prisoners incarcerated at MCC were pretrial
detainees. Id. at 523. Because of an "unprecedented" increase in pretrial detainees, the
MCC had to place two prisoners in cell originally built for one, more commonly known
as "double-celling." Id. at 525-26.
43. Id. at 545. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (random searches of
prison cells essential for effective prison security); cf Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189
(9th Cir. 1979) (unwarranted use of tear gas in dangerous quantities violates the eighth
amendment). Because the eighth amendment's purpose is to protect convicted persons
it will always guarantee prisoners full protection of their rights during incarceration.
Id. at 193-94.
44. 441 U.S. at 561-62. The Bell court specifically mentioned institutional security.
The Court stated that body cavity inspections is one example of a condition of confine-
ment reasonably related to prison security. Id. at 560. The Court noted that maintain-
ing security in a prison qualifies as a "permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the
facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates or both." Id. at 561.
45. Id. at 545-46. Prisoners retain only their basic liberty rights. Id. at 545. See,
e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (right to privacy); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (right to unionize); Wolff v. McDonnell,
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internal prison security both to ensure the safety of prisoners and
prison officials and to prevent escapes justified further limitations on
inmates' constitutional rights.4 6
To facilitate effective pursuit of these ends, the Bell Court main-
tained that prison officials must be afforded wide-ranging deference in
adopting and executing prison policies and practices and enforcing in-
ternal order and discipline.4 7 The Court recognized that prison offi-
cials, not the courts, are the experts in prison operations. 4 The Court
concluded that for this reason, the oversight of prison operations is the
proper responsibility of the legislative and executive branches, not the
judicial branch.4 9
In Johnson v. Glick5 ° the Second Circuit established guidelines to
determine whether prison officials used unnecessary force in discipli-
418 U.S. 539 (1974) (right to open mail in private); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266
(1948) (right to personally argue appeal or to be present at appellate court); Weber v.
Dell, 630 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (fourth amendment protection from
strip/body cavity searches).
46. 441 U.S. at 547.
47. Id. at 547. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). See Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The Court in Procunier stated that prison officials were re-
sponsible for maintaining order and discipline inside the prison, for safeguarding the
prison against illegal entry or escape, and for rehabilitating the prisoners "to the extent
that human nature and inadequate resources allow. . . ." 416 U.S. at 404-05. Thus,
because the problems in America's prisons "are complex and intractable [they] are not
readily susceptible to resolution by decree." Id. See also Jones v. North Carolina Pris-
oners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prisoners prohibited from soliciting other
inmates and from holding group meetings due to potential for disruption of prison ad-
ministration); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985) (prison officials not
liable for prisoner's injuries following an unexpected prison bus fire).
48. 441 U.S. at 547. Courts defer to the professional expertise of prison officials in
the absence of any substantial evidence indicating that the officials have exaggerated
their response to security considerations. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (random searches of prison cells "reason-
ably related" to prison security concerns); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (burden on prisoners to prove that prison officials' fears that
prisoners' union would pose a danger to security were unreasonable). Prison officials
frequently must exercise discretion quickly and in dangerous situations. See Norris v.
District of Columbia, 614 F. Supp. 294, 299 (D.D.C. 1985) (use of mace to control
prisoner is within discretion of prison officials).
49. 441 U.S. at 548. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (legislatures
possess broad authority to determine the types and limits of punishments for crimes);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (expertise, comprehensive planning, and the
commitment of resources are within province of the legislative and executive branches
of government); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (federal courts do not supervise
prisons, they only enforce prisoners' constitutional rights).
50. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). In Johnson a prison
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nary action and addressed whether certain limitations on prisoner
rights were constitutional. 1 The court held that a prison officer com-
mitted a cruel and unusual act when he brutally and without provoca-
tion attacked a pretrial detainee, but that the act did not violate the
eighth amendment because it was not for punishment purposes.52 The
court, however, listed four factors to consider when prison officials use
force in a disciplinary fashion for punishment purposes:5 3 (1) whether
force was necessary, (2) whether the amount of force used was reason-
ably related to the need for force, (3) the extent of injury inflicted, and
(4) whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically solely to cause
harm.5 4 Courts have since used these guidelines to determine whether
a use of force constituted cruel and unusual punishment.5
Whitley v. Albers56 presented the Court with an opportunity to re-
view the standards of behavior that constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment during incarceration. 7 In Whitley the Court delegated wide
guard struck the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, with an object enclosed in the guard's fist,
causing the plaintiff to suffer severe head pain. Id. at 1029-30.
51. Id. at 1033. The court recognized the difficulty involved when only a few
guards are responsible for managing large numers of prisoners. Id. In order to main-
tain control, the court stated that prison officials may resort to intentional force. Id.
See supra notes 9, 36 and accompanying texts for discussion of the amount of force
prison officials may use to maintain order and control.
52. 481 F.2d at 1032. The eighth amendment refers to "punishment" imposed upon
prisoners for penal or disciplinary purposes. Id. See Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774
F.2d 1567 (11 th Cir. 1985) (eighth amendment applies only to convicted persons); Wil-
liams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1983) (due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendment protects pretrial detainees). See generally Note, supra note 36
(eighth amendment applies to prison discipline).
53. 481 F.2d at 1033.
54. Id. Such factors determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred. Id.
See also Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass. 1982) (determination whether
the use of force is unconstitutional is a question of fact).
55. Sampley v. Ruetgers, 704 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1983). In Sampley the court uti-
lized the Johnson guidelines to determine whether a prison guard's use of force against a
prisoner was wanton and unnecessary. Id. at 495-96. See Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d
963 (4th Cir. 1984) (Johnson guidelines incorporated in jury instructions to help jurors
decide if prison guard's use of mace was excessive and unjustified force); supra notes 37-
41 and accompanying text (discusses standards of conduct constituting cruel and unu-
sual punishment).
56. 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986). See supra notes 6-11 for detailed outline of the facts.
57. 106 S. Ct. at 1084. See supra notes 38-41 (discussion of pertinent standards of
culpability for prison officials under the eighth amendment).
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ranging deference to prison officials.5 8 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, reaffirmed that only unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.5 9 The Court then ap-
plied this standard6" to the security manager's order to shoot low at
any prisoner who interfered with the rescue attempt. 61 The Court rea-
soned that because the prison official shot Albers in the knee while he
was running towards the security manager, the prison official's action
was not wanton.6 2 The majority affirmed the Court's Estelle holding
that prison officials who are merely negligent in areas that serve no
penological purpose, such as treating prisoners' medical needs 63 or pro-
viding prisoners with adequate living conditions,' do not violate the
eighth amendment.6 ' The Court further recognized that safety meas-
ures employed in quelling a prison disturbance also serve no penologi-
cal purpose 6 6 and concluded that conduct more culpable than
negligence was required to impose liability.67
58. 106 S. Ct. at 1085. The Court cited both Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977), and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), to
support this contention. See supra notes 43-45, 47-49 and accompanying texts (dis-
cusses constitutional parameters of acceptable prison official conduct).
59. 106 S. Ct. at 1084-85. See supra note 34 (defines unnecessary punishment).
60. 106 S. Ct. at 1086. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (Court found inflic-
tion of pain during prison security measure was a constitutional use of force).
61. 106 S. Ct. at 1087. The Court emphasized that Whitley's order to shoot only to
disable those prisoners interfering with the rescue attempt indicated his intent to avoid
inflicting pain "in a wanton [or] unnecessary fashion." Id.
62. Id. The Court found that the prison official had a plausible basis for believing
that Albers posed a threat to Whitley and the hostage. Because the prison official was
under orders to shoot in these circumstances, the shooting amounted to a "good faith
effort to restore prison security." Id. The Court also recognized that the prison officials
were faced with an emergency situation with very little time to react. Id. See Newby v.
Serviss, 590 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (prison officials may use deadly force as
last resort to prevent prison escape).
63. 106 S. Ct. at 1084. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for discussion
of constitutional guarantees concerning treatment of prisoners' medical needs.
64. 106 S. Ct. at 1084. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text for discussion of
prisoners' constitutional right to adequate living conditions during incarceration.
65. 106 S. Ct. at 1084. The Court explained that a prison official's conduct that
"does not purport to be punishment at all" must demonstrate more than a negligent
disregard for the prisoner's safety to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
66. Id. The Court warned that infliction of pain during a prison security measure,
such as quelling a riot, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment even if hind-
sight reveals that the degree of force used was unreasonable. Id.
67. Id. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for discussion of the negli-
gence standard.
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Justice O'Connor distinguished safety measures, however, from
medical treatment and confinement conditions for purposes of judicial
review.68 In particular, the Court stressed that safety measures taken
during a prison disturbance protect inmates and prison officials alike,69
but medical treatment and healthy confinement conditions aid prison-
ers only.7" In making this distinction, the majority emphasized the
necessity of extending optimum deference to prison officials during a
riot because of their increased risk of being harmed.71
After establishing these standards of liability and deference, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the prison officials acted in good faith.72 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court examined several factors present
prior to the shooting, such as the hostage situation, the fact that nu-
merous inmates were outside of their cells, and the added vulnerability
of the security manager. 73 The majority applied the Johnson guidelines
and found the presence of these factors sufficient to decide in favor of
the prison officials.74
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, accepted the majority's position that
prison authorities are entitled to deference during prison distur-
bances. 75 He disagreed, however, with the majority's opinion that the
safety of the prison staff and other inmates warrants greater deference
68. 106 S. Ct. at 1084.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1084-85.
71. Id. at 1085. The Court explained that the eighth amendment applies in two
situations. The first situation concerns prison officials' responsibilities towards the in-
mates. Id. The second situation involves the choice between protecting inmates versus
prison officials when officials must take immediate action during prison unrest. Id. Re-
ferring to the first situation, the Court added that "a deliberate indifference standard
does not adequately capture the importance of such completing obligations." Id. See
supra notes 9, 47-48 (discusses limits of constitutionally permissible safety measures).
72. 106 S. Ct. at 1085. The majority recognized the conflicting testimony of Albers
and the security manager regarding the atmosphere inside the prison prior to the Al-
bers' shooting. Id. at 1086. Albers testified that the prison disturbance had subsided
before the shooting occurred. Id. at 1090. Albers further testified that he stopped run-
ning and froze in place when he noticed the prison official looking at him. Id. at 1087.
The prison official testified that "he saw several inmates running... [after] Whitley, and
that he fired at their legs." Id. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text for a
discussion of "good faith" immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
73. 106 S. Ct. at 1086.
74. Id. at 1085. The Court applied the Johnson guidelines and decided that the
security officer had used force in good faith to restore discipline. Id. at 1087.
75. Id. at 1088-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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to the officials.7 6 The dissent's central theme found error with the dis-
trict court's issuance of a directed verdict.7 7 The dissent argued that
reasonable persons could differ on whether the prison officer's use of
force was "unnecessary and wanton."7 8
The majority's decision that Albers did not suffer cruel and unusual
punishment was correct for two reasons. First, the Court held that the
infliction of pain was not unnecessary and wanton in accordance with
the Whitley facts and prior case history.7 9 Second, the force used was
not excessive, considering that a more violent riot may have erupted if
the security officer had not stopped Albers from obstructing the rescue
attempt, and that the security manager's and hostage's lives were at
stake.8°
Whitley illustrates the Court's ardent belief that prison officials, not
the court, should operate the jails.8" The Court's reasoning is both
realistic and practical. Only with freedom to respond quickly and in-
stinctively to prison disturbances, particularly when their own lives
may be in danger, can prison officials effectively control disobedient
prisoners and prevent further violence.82 The Court further explained
76. Id. at 1089 (Marshall, J. dissenting). Justice Marshall criticized the majority for
increasing the evidentiary burden on prisoners who now must prove that the prison
disturbance posed risks to the safety of the prison staff and inmates. Id.
77. Id. Justice Marshall contended that the district court was incorrect in deciding
to send the constitutional claim to the jury based upon judicially determined facts,
rather than let the jury reach its own determination of the facts. Id. See supra note 16
for discussion of the district court's issuance of a directed verdict. Justice Marshall
vigorously urged instead that a critical question of fact existed which warranted a trial
by jury. 106 S. Ct. at 1089-90. The dissent argued that the district court and the major-
ity failed to properly look favorably towards Albers' testimony. Id. at 1090. Albers
testified that the "riot" had quieted down and that Whitley knew that the hostage was
out of danger before shooting Albers. Id. Moreover, the dissent mentioned that the
prison officials failed to give Albers sufficient warning of their potential use of force. Id.
78. 106 S. Ct. at 1090-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 77 (discusses
conflicting testimony).
79. 106 S. Ct. at 1084-86. See supra notes 34, 36 for discussion of unnecessary and
wanton punishment.
80. 106 S. Ct. at 1086. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text for discussion
of the Johnson guidelines.
81. 106 S. Ct. at 1085. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discusses
deference accorded prison officials).
82. 106 S. Ct. at 1084. The Court explained that inflicting pain for security pur-
poses does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment "simply because in retrospect
the degree of force.., was unreasonable." Id. See supra note 62 (prison official acts in
good faith if conduct founded on plausible basis). The Court recognized that decisions
in emergency situations are often made "in haste, under pressure, and frequently with-
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that such deference applies to prison officials both when responding to
actual prison disturbances and when taking measures to prevent poten-
tial disturbances.8 3 Furthermore, because the Court utilized a negli-
gence standard under which any behavior more culpable than
negligence subjects a prison officials to potential liability, 4 officials will
have difficulty abusing this discretion.
Whitley recognized order and control as essential goals in prison
management8 5 and established a practical test for determining when
prison officials will be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.86 Whitley thus
enables prison officials to exude greater confidence when protecting
and defending themselves and their fellow officers during a riot. 7 As
long as prison officials demonstrate a good faith and no more than neg-
ligent attempt to discipline prisoners and maintain order, they will en-
joy immunity from liability under the eighth amendment.8  Prison
officials, faced with overcrowding and limited resources, will thus be
out the luxury of a second chance." 106 S. Ct. at 1085. See supra note 62 and accompa-
nying text (constitutional propriety of response must account for limited reaction time).
See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text for discussion of deference extended to
prison officials.
83. 106 S. Ct. at 1085.
84. Id. at 1084-85. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for discussion of
the negligence standard.
85. Id. at 1085-86. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
The dissent objected strongly to the majority's position on substantive and procedural
issues. As to the substantive issues of liability, the dissent was fearful that the majority
opinion may be abused in subsequent cases. 106 S. Ct. at 1090-91. The dissent ex-
pressed concern that the majority was insensitive to expert testimony in support of Al-
bers. Id. Justice Marshall's dissent began with a rejection of the negligence standard
that the majority purported to adopt. The dissent asserted that the majority would
permit prison officials to act recklessly during the prison disturbance and still enjoy
immunity from § 1983 liability. Id. at 1089. Justice Marshall pointed to language in
the majority opinion that he understood to require "express intent" to violate the eighth
amendment before prison officials would be subject to liability. Id. The dissent's proce-
dural criticism maintained that a jury should have decided the outcome. Id. at 1089-92.
The dissent's mocking of the prison officials' reactions to the prison disturbance re-
vealed its unrealistic view of the prison official's plight. See, e.g., id. at 1090-91. An
armed inmate, who had already told Whitley that he had killed another inmate earlier,
was holding a security officer hostage. Id. at 1086-87. Thus, the prison officials had
every reason to be agitated and to act quickly to quell any violent uprising.
86. 106 S. Ct. at 1086-87. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of the majority's negligence standard.
87. See supra note 71 and accompanying text for relevant discussion of applying the
eighth amendment.
88. 106 S. Ct. 1087-88. See supra notes 25-28, 34-37 and accompanying texts for
discussion of governmental immunity under § 1983 and the negligence standard.
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better able to effectively operate prisons in situations in which the
prison officials themselves may be in actual or potential danger. Yet,
the Court's affirmance of the negligence standard89 leaves an upper
limit on prison officials' discretionary actions in prison violence
situations.
Ellen K. Lawson
89. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for discussion of the negligence
standard.
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